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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
ENGLISH COURTS OF COMMON LAW AND EQUITY.'
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO4
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN-

ACTION. See National Bank.
Taking of Land by Corporaton.-Suitfor Damages and also for
Value of the Land.-The owner of land, which has been unlawfully
and wrongfully taken and appropriated to its use, by a corporation authorized by law to appropriate land, cannot maintain an action for the
value of the land so taken and appropriated, and also damages accruing
by reason of such taking and appropriation, if the circumstances are
such that he may recover the land itself: Atlantic and Great Western
Railroad Co. v. Robbins et al., 35 Ohio St.
AGENT.

See Broker.

Undisclosed Principal, Sale of Goods to Agent of-Payment by
Principal,under what Circumstances an Answer to an Action brought
by the Seller for the Price.-The defendants employed C., a broker, to
buy oil for them. 0. accordingly bought of the plaintiffs, informing
them.at the time of the sale that he was buying for principals, though
he did not tell them who those principals were. The terms of the sale
were "cash on or before delivery;" but though it is not infrequent in
the oil trade, in such a case, to require payment before delivery, there
is no invariable custom to that effect. The plaintiffs delivered the oil
to C., without insisting on prepayment, and the defendants, not knowing that the plaintiffs had not been paid, paid C. Shortly afterwards
C. stopped payment, and the plaintiffs thereupon sued the defendants
for the price: Beld, affirming the decision of BOWEN, J., that, as the
plaintiffs at the time of the sale knew the broker was buying for principals and not on his own account, the fact of the defendants having
paid the broker did not preclude the plaintiffs from suing them for the
price, unless, before such payment, they had by their conduct indnced
the defendants to believe that they had already been paid by the broker,
and that the mer'e omission on the part of the plaintiffs to insist on prepayment was not, in the absence of an invariable custom to that effect,
such conduct as would reasonably induce such belief: Irvine v. Watson,
Law Rep., 5 Q. B. Div.
I Prepared expressly for the American Maw Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1879. The cases will probably be reported in 12 Otto.
' Selected from late numbers of the Law Reports.
3 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 35 Ohio St. Reports.
4 From A. Wilson Norris, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 90 Penn. St. Reports.
5 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 50 Wis. Reports.
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Reald v. Kenworthy. 10 Ex. 739; 24 L. J. Ex.76, followed.
strong v. Stokes, Law Rep., 7 Q. B. 598, discussed: Id.

Arm-

AMENDMENT.

Variance-Restatement of Cause of Action.-In an action on con
tract, where the -facts proven by evidence received without objection,
show that plaintiff has a good cause of action against defendant, on a
contract different from that set out in the complaint, it seems, that the
complaint may be amended in accordance with those facts, or the vari
ance may be disregarded. So intimated where the suit was upon an
account, and the other cause of action proven (if any) was upon defendant's endorsement of a promissory note transferred by him, before due,
to the plaintiff, and which he alleges that plaintiff, by his default in
respect to collecting or returning the same, had made his own : Marschuetz v. Wright, 50 Wis.
ATTORNEY.

Services to Receiver-Bow Compensationto be obtained.-Wherethe
compensation of an attorney for professional services in securing a fund
in the hands of a receiver for distribution is, by the rules governing
courts of equity, a proper charge upon the fund, application for such
compensation out of the fund should be made in the action in which
the receiver was appointed: Olds v. Tucker, 35 Ohio St.
BROKER.

Agent-Brokers implied Undertaking for Skill and Care.-M. &
Co., who were bankers and brokers, gave to J. a letter to their correspondent, G., a broker in Philadelphia, stating, "this will introduce to
you J. Any orders he may give you, please execute on our account
and advise us." G. took his orders from J. in the purchase and sale
of stocks, but reported to M. & Co. and made his calls upon them for
the necessary margins. In their accounts, 1.& Co. also treated J.as
dealing directly with them. and he was charged on their books with
the stocks, commissions and interest, and credited with the proceeds
of sales. Held, that M. & Co. were the agents of J., and they could
not ignore G.'s agency, and cast the responsibility of a loss upon J.,
simply because his orders were taken and obeyed in the purchase
and sale of the stocks: Gheen, Morgan & Co., v. Johnson, 90 Penn.
.St.G. deposited a margin with B., another broker, without demanding
security therefor, but, according to the custom of the Board of Brokers,
it was optional with G. to do so. He acted in good faith, and when the
deposit was made with B., the latter was in full credit. Held, that
there was no evidence of negligence, such as would make G. responsible
for a loss occurring through B.'s insolvency: Id.
The law implies a promise from brokers, bankers or other agents, that
they will severally exercise competent skill and proper care in the services they undertake to perform, but it neither implies nor requires anything more: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.

Undertaking as Insurer of Baggage does not extend to Trunk of Samples of Merchandise.-The implied undertaking of a carrier to insure
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the safety of baggage does not extend to the contents of a trunk, con
sisting of samples of merchandise, which the passenger, a travelling
salesman, carries to facilitate his business in making sales. But the
carrier, by taking the property into his charge and putting it in his
warehouse for safe keeping, assumes the relation to it of an ordinary
bailee, and he is bound to take such care of the property as a man of
ordinary prudence would of his own, under like circumstances: Penn.
sylvania Co. v. Miller & Co., 35 Ohio St.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See Contract.

CONTRACT. See Evidence.
Illegal Consideration-Promisenot to prosecute 6riminal.-A promissory note is void, where the consideration therefor is the promise of
the payee that he will refrain from prosecuting the son of the maker for
forgery: Nationol Bank of Oxford v. Kirk, 90 Penn. St.
Fulton v. Hood, 10 Casey 365, distinguished: Id.

In Restraint of Trade- Validity-Limitation as to Space-Reasonableness-ForeignJudgment-Enforcing by English Court.-There is
no absolute rule that a covenant in restraint of trade is void if it is
unlimited in regard to space. The question in each case is whether
the restraint extends further than is necessary for the reasonable protection of the covenantee. If it does not do that, the performance of
the covenant will be enforced, even though the restriction be unlimited
as to space: Roussillon v. Roussillon, Law Rep. 14 Chan. Div.
Allsopp v. Wheatcroft, Law Rep., 15 Eq. 59, disapproved; Leather
Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, Law Rep., 9 Eq. 345, followed: rd.
If an agreement, contrary to the policy of the English law, is entered
into in a country, by the law of which it is valid, an English court will
not enforce it: id.
The policy of the English law in favor of trade, applies to foreignera
trading in England equally with English subjects : -1d.
The principles on which the court acts in enforcing judgments of a
foreign court discussed: Id.
The defendant, a Swiss subject, entered into an agreement with the
plaintiffs, French subjects, residing in France, when he was in France
on a temporary visit, he being then domiciled in Switzerland, but residing in England. The plaintiffs afterwards obtained judgment against
him in a French court for breach of the agreement. He was not in
France at the commencement of or at any time during the action, and
he had no notice of the proceedings, though the plaintiffs knew his
address in England, where he was then still residing: Held, that the
judgment could not be enforced by an English court: Id.
Schibsby v. Westenholz, Law Rep., 6 Q. B. 155, considered: .d.
Subscription for certain Purpose-Failureof Cosideraton-Practicability of Carrying out the Purpose Contemplated.-ForeignGovern.
ment-Revocation of a Concession.-Where money has been subscribed
by bondholders for a particular purpose (such as the construction of a
railroad) and part of that money has been placed in the hands of trustees for the bondholders, the duty of such trustees being to pay portions
of the money as portions of the intended railroad are constructed, if no
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such railroad nor any portion of it is constructed, and its construction
becomes impracticable, the bondholders are entitled to demand from
the trustees repayment of what remains in their hands: National Bolivian Co. v. Wilson, Law Rep. 5 Appeal Cases.
Where there is a right dependent on the practicability of doing a
certain work, the question of its practicability is not to be determined
solely by physical or financial reasons, but conditions previously stipulated (especially where the interests and the rights of third parties are
concerned) must be considered: Id.
Thus, where a loan was raised to make a railroad in a foreign country,
such loan being raised on the faith of a prospectus which set forth, as
a security to the bondholders, the grant of a concession by the foreign
government, in virtue of which the bondholders would have the benefit of the customs duties imposed by that government on goods passing
along that railroad, and the foreign government, finding the railroad
not made, revoked its concession, the loss of the security which the
concessiou had afforded to the bondholders, entitled them to treat the
scheme as a failure, and to demand the return of their subscriptions: id.
A foreign government granted a concession, on the terms of which
a company was formed and a loan raised, and bondholders constituted.
The government afterwards revoked the concession. Held, that its right
to do so could not be questioned in any legal proceedings in this country: 11.
Written cannot be Varied by Parol Agreements at the Time or Previously-Construction of.-A written contract cannot be varied or controlled by parol agreements between the parties made previously to, or
simultaneously with, its execution; Cooper et al. v. Cleghorn, 50 Wis.
Plaintiffs entered into contract with defendants to furnish machinery
for agrist-mill in Wisconsin. By its terms they promised and agreed to
sell certain described machinery, including an engine and boiler; also
the necessary plans, drawings and specifications and bills of material,
and the necessary time of a competent mechanic to superintend the
erection of said engine and boiler, and the time of "a competent millwright" to superintend the erection of the other machinery; said machineiy to be ready for delivery at plaintiff's iron works at Mt. Vernon,
Ohio, on the 20th of July 1875 ; said sale to be made upon the payment by defendants of $8400 as follows: $400 by June 1st 1875,
$5000 on or before the shipment of the machinery, and the balance
four months thereafter. Plaintiffs agreed to deliver the machinery,
boxed and in good order for transportation, at the depot at Mt. Vernon ;
and it was further agreed that "the title, ownership and right of possession of the aforesaid machinery shall remain in the first party (the
plaintiffs) until the cash is paid as above agreed, when the same shall
vest in the party of the second part." Held, that, the machinery having
been so affixed to the mill that it cannot be removed without material
injury to the realty, and this having been done by the act of defendants,
and pursuant to the intention of the parties when the contract was entered into, plaintiffs, treating the transaction as a sale of the machinery,
may enforce a lien on the buildings for the amount still due them under
the contract: Id.
The contract provided that plaintiff should furnish defendant certain
burr mill stones "faced and furrowed;" and it clearly appears that
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plaintiff furnished such stones, and that the words "faced and farrowed," as used among millers, did not imply that the stones sLoult be
dressed and in a condition to use. Held, that it was incompetent for
defendants to show that, from conversation with one of the plaintiffs
prior to the execution of, the contract, they were led to suppose that
stones which were faced and furrowed would be dressed and in condition for immediate use: Id.
If it appeared that the millwright furnished by plaintiffs under the
contract was a perfectly " competent" one, and yet that he made serious
mistakes in superintending the work, guare whether plaintiffs would be
responsible therefor, or whether such millwright would be deemed
defendants' agent and employee in superintending the work : Id.
CORPORATION.

See Action; Sale.

DAMAGES.

Measure of-Agreement to sell Propertyin Considerationof Payment
of Debts-Insolvency of Vendors-Action by Trustee for Breach of
Contract-Nominal Damages.-A. & S. being traders in embarrassed
circumstances, sold their business to the defendant, upon condition that
he should pay certain debts owing by them. This he failed to do, and
left a balance of 1750L unpaid to the creditors of A. & S. A. & S.
afterwards liquidated their affairs by arrangement, under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and the plaintiff having been appointed trustee,
brought an action for breach of contract: Held, that he was entitled tn
recover the sum of 17501., and not merely nominal damages: Ashdown
v. Ingamells, Law Rep., 5 Ex. Div.
Porterv. Vorley, 9 Bing. 93, disapproved of: Id.
Railway Accident-Loss of Profits of l'ade or Profession.-In an
action against a railway company for personal injury to a passenger, the
jury in assessing the damages may take into their consideration, besides
the pain and suffering of the plaintiff, and the expense incurred by him
for medical and other necessary attendance, the loss he has sustained
through his inability to continue a lucrative, professional practice:
Phillips v. London and South Western Railway Co., Law Rep., 5 0.
P. Div.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Notes of Third Party as Security-Failure of Creditor to collect
when due.-A creditor who receives from his debtor the note of a third
party as collateral security, and without negligence on his part, fails to
collect such note when due, and afterwards, in the absence of any demand by the debtor, retains possession of the note, will not be preventeu
by those facts from recovering the full amount of his demand against
such debtor: .Marschuetz et al. v. Wright, 50 Wis.
DEED.

Acceptance binds Grantee.-The acceptance by the grantee of a deed
or land contract executed by the grantor alone, binds such grantee:
Hubbard v. Marshall, 50 Wis.
EASEMENT.

Alley way-Title by User must be by Adverse not Permissive Use.-
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In an action for damages for the obstruction of an alley, it is competent
for the defendant to prove, by way of mitigation of damages, that it was
not the plaintiff's only means of access to the rear of his property:
Demuth v. Amweg, 90 Penn. St.
Twenty-one years adverse user of an easement gives rise to the presumption of a grant; that there was a gate maintained across an alley
is of no consequence, if the plaintiff and those under whom he claimed,
used it whenever he chose to do so : d.
That the defendant or some one of" his predecessors in title, gave
notice at a sheriff's sale of the property, that he claimed the exclusive
right and ownership of the alley in question, could not affect the plaintiff, if he were not present when such notice was given. Assertion of
title is not enough: it must, to be effective, be accompanied with some
act, which, at least for the time being, would prevent the use of the
easement: Id.
If the use of the way by the plaintiff was merely a permissive use,
and the jury, from the evidence as it appears in the case, might so have
found, then he could not claim the easement as of right, fbr, in that
event, no presumption of grant could arise from the mere lapse of time.
In order to establish such right, the user must be adverse, not permissive : 1d.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
See Actio.
Improvements in Violation of Act of Conress-Appropriation of
by Railroad.-Thefact that a riparian owner improves his property
without complying with an Act of Congress relating to such improvements, does not relieve a railroad company, which appropriates such
improvements, from liability to make compensation: Davenport and
Northwestern Railroad Go. v. Renwick, S. C. U. S., Oct. 1879.
EQUITY.

See JudicialSale.

EVIDENCE. See Contract; JudicialSale.
Parol,to Contradict Writin.-Plaintiff sold, assigned and delivered
to defendant, for an agreed consideration in money, certain notes and
mortgages of a third party, and all his interest in a contract for the
sale of certain land by him to such third party, the assignment being
in writing under seal, executed by the plaintiff alone, and containing a
statement of the consideration and stipulations for the security of the
plaintiff and as to the effect of a default by the defendant to make the
payments therein specified; and in execution of said agreement, defendant paid a part of the sum named as consideration, and delivered to
plaintiff his three promissory notes for the remainder. In an action on
the notes, held, that defendant cannot prove a contemporaneous oral agreement by which, in case the timber on the lands described in the contract
should fall short of a certain amount, he was to be allowed at a certain
rate per Al. for the shortage, and that there was such a shortage: Hubbard v. Marshall, 50 Wis.
Note whose Genuineness is Disputed.-In an action on a note, where
the genuineness of the signature was denied, and the attesting witness
had given evidence having some tendency to show that the signature
was genuine, it was not- error to admit the note itself along with the
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evidence bearing on the question of its genuineness. Holmes Adm'r v
Cook, 50 Wis.
Where it was admitted by plaintiff that defendant made the note
merely as a loan of his credit to the payee, and by defendant that at
the date of said note he had indorsed for the payee's accommodation,
there Was no error in rejecting evidence for the defendant as to his dealings with the payee before and at the date of the note (to show that he
was not indebted to the payee), or as to the amount of money which
defendant had on deposit subject to his check ; the evidence being
immaterial: Id.
See Contract.
FOREIGN GOVTRNMENT.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

See Contract.

FRAUD.

Rescission of Written Instrumentsfor-Husbandand Wife.-Written
instruments will not be cancelled or rescinded on the ground of fraud,
except upon clear and convincing proofs: Lavassarv. Washburne, 5OWis.
Where a married woman sues to set aside a conveyance of her land
executed by herself and her husband, on the ground that its execution
was procured by defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations, if it appears
that the negotiations which resulted in its execution were all between
defendant and the plaintiff's husband acting as her agent, she is bound
by his acts, and the case is as if the husband had been owner of the
land and plaintiff in the action: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Fraud.

Authority to pledge Credit during Chabitation-.Necessaries-Revocation of Implied Authority.-A husband, who is able and willing to
supply his wife with necessaries, and who has forbidden her to pledge
his credit, cannot be held liable for necessaries bought by her ; and a
tradesman, without notice of the husband's prohibition and without
having had previous dealings with the wife with his ussent. cannot
maintain an action against him for the price of articles of female attire
suitable to her station in life, and supplied to her upon his credit but
without his knowledge or assent: Debenham v. Mellon, Law Rep., 5 Q.
B. Div.
Jolly v. Rees, 15 0. B. N. S. 628, approved of: Id.
See Vendor and Purchaser.
Application is Part of Tolicy-False Representation-Intent not
.ateral.-Where, in a policy of insurance, the written application is
referred to and expressly made part of the contract, such application
thereby becomes part of the same as fully as if embodied in the policy:
Byers v. Farmers'Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.
One condition of the policy was, " and any false representations made
by the assured, of the condition or occupancy of the property, or any
material fact-material to the risk," avoid the policy: Held, that representations concerning a matter material to the risk contained in the ap.
plication, if untrue in fact, avoid the policy, whether made intentionally or otherwise : id.
In said application the question was: "Is the property encumbered ?
If so, state to what amount, and the value of the premises." Ans.
INSURANCE.
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Yes; mortgage, $2000-$10,000." When the fact was, this mort
gage, which was made by the insured, was $3200 principal and $240,
accrued interest: Held, that this was a false representation, material to
the risk, which avoided the policy: Id.
It was a condition of the policy that, "if the property be sold or transferred, or any change take place in the title, either by legal process or
otherwise, * * * without the consent of the company, the policy shall
be void." This condition was not broken by the execution of a mortgage on the property, without such consent: Id.
Seawortiness.-To render a ship "seaworthy," within the meaning
of a contract of insurance, she must be sufficiently furnished with
proper cables and anchors: Lawton v. Royal Canadian Ins. Co., 50
Wis.
INTEREST.

Covenant to pay Money on a Day certain-Rate of Interest-By a
mortgage-deed reciting an agreement for an advance at 101.per cent.,
the mortgagor covenanted for payment of the principal sum at the expiration of twelve months, and for the payment of interest in the mean.
time at the rate of 101. per cent. per annum, but there was no covenant
as to payment of interest in the event of the principal sum, or any part
of it, remaining unpaid after the day named for repayment. The
money was not repaid on the day, but interest at 10L.
per cent. was paid
for several years. The mortgagor having died, and a decree having
been made for administration of his estate, the mortgagee proved as a
creditor for the principal sum and interest.
eld, that interest was
recoverablo only as damages, and ought to be limited to 51. per cent.
In re Roberts. Goodchap v. Roberts, Law Rep. 14 Chan. Div.
JUDGMENT.

Of Restitution by Superior Court in reversing Judgment is Cnwlurive.-Tbe court reversing a judgment has inherent power to make an
order of restitution, which order when made will be final and conclusive
between the parties, and cannot be questioned by them collaterally; and,
in such case, an action may be maintained by the plaintiff in error
against the defendant in error, to recover money paid by the former on
the judgment prior to the reversal, in which action it will be no defence
for the defendaint in error to show that the money was paid voluntarily:
tiler v. Hiler, 35 Ohio St.
JUDICIAL SALE.

Impeaching Itle of Pwrchaser.-Irregulartiesin Proceedings.-The
title of a purchaser at a judicial sale, as a general rule, cannot be impeached, in equity, for errors or irregularities in the proceedings; but
where a tract of land not in fact sold, and for which no consideration
was paid or intended to he paid, is, by mistake, included in the report
of sales, such mistake may be corrected, in equity, as against the purchaser or his heirs, even after confirmation and deed in pursuance
thereof: Stites v. Wiedner, 35 Ohio St.
Parol evidence may be admitted to prove such mistakes: Id.
MECHANICS' LIEN.

Extra work-Degree of Certaintyrequired-Architect.-Extrawork
VoL. XXVIII-92
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and materials done and furnished by a contractor during the perform.
ance of his agreement, may be included in and constitute a part of his
claim, if the claim be filed within the statutory period after the completion of the contract. Though outside the contract, they are so closely
connected with it that they have always been included, in filing the
claim, with those done and furnished under the contract:- Rush v. Able,
90 Penn. St.
All that is required to validate a mechanics' lien, is such certainty as
will enable those interested to discover during what period the materials
vere delivered, or the work done, so as to individuate the transaction:
Id.
Where an architect claims to have a lien for charges and fees, he
must show work done for which the statute gives a lien; and such work
is not shown by the name of his calling. Especially should the kind
of work be set forth distinctly, when it is claimed as extra work by the
contractor: -d.
B.ank v. Gries, 11 Casey 423, distinguished, and Price v. Kirk, 9
Norris 47, followed: Id.
NATIONAL BAN.K.

.Aions against.-Section 5198, Revised Statutes, providing for suits
against a~mational bank in the United States courts in the district, and
iwnthe state,courts in the county in which the bank is located, applies
only to transitory actions. In local actions such bank may be sued
where the property in controversy is situated, although not in the
district or county in which the bank is located: Casey, Receiver, &c., v.
Adamn, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
NEGrIGENCFL

mtri'butory- When for Jury.-Where there is evidence of negligeoeo on the part of defendant, and evidence from which it might be
inferred that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, the
evidence on both questions should-.be submitted to the jury : North
PFemylvaniaRailroad Co. v. Kirk, 90 Penn. St.
- On the line of defendant's railroad, plaintiff owned a lumber and coal
yardin which his son was employed. A siding ran from the railroad
to a warehouse in the plaintiff's yard. A lumber car was left standing
on the.siding, beyond the period when the rules of the company required
them to remove it. It had a defective brake and it was not shown that
it had been sufficiently blocked. A number of cars from a freight
train were started on to the siding from the main track, and striking
the lumber car, forced it down towards the warehouse, into which it
crashed'with; great violence. There was evidence also that the nearest
:of their cars had a defective brake. The son of the plaintiff, hearing
,the-sound of the approaching train, hurried towards the warehouse and
entered it and was found crushed to death against the doors. Held,
that it was properly lcft to the jury to determine whether defendants
were guiltyof negligence, and whether the deceased by his own negligence contributed to the accident: Id.
The son was twenty-eight years of age when the accident happened.
He had been away from home, at intervals, after be attained his
majority and had been in business on his own account. He had returned, however, to his father's house and was engaged in his father's

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

731

business, for which no compensation was paid him. I( appeared that
he intended to remain with his father, and that hi services were
valuable to him in his business. Held, that it was for the jury to decide
whether there was a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage
accruing to plaintiffs, which was destroyed by the loss of his son: Id.
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendants moved for a
nonsuit, unless the court should be of opinion that they would thereby
be precluded from offering any evidence, if the motion was overruled.
The court expressed the opinion that they would be precluded by such
motion made and overruled. To this ruling an exception was taken.
Reld,that the expression of the court on a motion in a form so peculiar,
was not such a ruling as entitled the defendants to an exception and
a
review in this court: Id.
A brakeman of defendant was asked: 'Did you omit to do anything
you could have done to prevent this accident ?" .Held,that it was competent to prove all the witness had done, but it was for the jury
to
decide whether by acts done or duties omitted he had been guilty
of
negligence: Id.
For the purpose of showing that the plaintiffs had been indemnified
for the loss of their son, the defendants offered to show that they had
received $5000, the amount of a policy of insurance on the life of their
zon. Reid, that the court properly excluded this evidence: Id.
Contributory Negligence- When Nonsuit may be Granted-Railroad
Crossing-Injury to Traveller.-,-In an action for an injury, occasioned
by negligence, where the circumstances require of plaintiff the exercise
of due care to avoid the injury, and his testimony does not disclose any
want of such care on his part, the burden is upon defendant to show
such contributory negligence as will defeat a recovery: Baltimore
&
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Wlritacre, 35 Ohio St.
But if plaintiff's own testimony in support of his cause of action
raises a presumption of such contributory negligence, the burden rests
upon him to remove that presumption: Id.
In an action by a traveller on a public highway, against a railroad
company, to recover for injuries by collision with a passing train at
a
public crossing, alleged to have been caused by negligence in the management of the train, where the evidence tends to show that he did
not
exercise proper care and caution to avoid the injury, it is competent for
him to show that there was no signboard up, as is required by law,
as
reflecting upon the question of his want of care, although the want
of
such signboard is not alleged as a ground of recovery: Id.
Where a person familiar with a dangerous railroad crossing, in passing
over the same, neglects the exercise of any care to ascertain if a passing
train is near, and in consequence of such neglect is injured by a collision
with the train, he is guilty of negligence, and the mere fact that
he
had forgotten that he was in the vicinity of the crossing will not excuse
such neglect: Id.
NEW TRmI.

Verdict based on eitherof two Grounds-Failureof Court to Instruct.
-Where a verdict for the plaintiff may have been rendered upon
either of two causes of action, but it does appear upon which, a refusal
to give a proper instruction on behalf of the defendant, as to either
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cause of action, will entitle him to a new trial: Pennsyjlvania Co.v
Miler & Co., 35 Ohio St.
039c.
Eleqibility at 2'me of Ection not Requisi.-The doctrine that a
person elected to an office, though not eligible at the time of the
election, may take and hold the office, if his disibility is removed within
the time limited to him by law for entering upon its duties, adhered to.
&ate of Wisconsin and Geilfuss v. Trumpf, 50 Wis.
PARTY WALL.

ExC-cRson of one Tenant by the Other.-The most ordinary and the
primary meaning of the term "party-wall," is a wall of which the two
adjoining owners are tenants in common: Watson v. Gray, Law Rep.
14 Chan. Div.
If one of the two tenants in common of such a wall excludes the
other from the use of it by placing an obstruction on it, the only remedy
of the excluded tenant is to remove the obstruction: Id.
The owners in fee of two adjoining houses derived title to them from
a common predecessorin title. In the conveyances from that predecessor
to the two owners respectively, was contained a declaration that the wall
which divided the yards at the back of the two houses should be and
remain a party-wall. Held, that the two owners were tenants in common of the wall: 1d.
See Amendme;nt.
PL.ADiiN.
PRACTIoe.

See Amendment; Verdict; Witness.

RAILROAD.

See Eminext Domain; Negligence.
RzoEIvxn.

of
Assignment
7,uture-acquired

See Attorney.
SALi.
Proertt-tockin Trade, substLu-

ioa of.-By a bill of sale the grantor assigned to the grantee the stock
in trade then in certain specified premises, and also the stock in trade
which should or might at any time during the continuance of the
security be brought into the premises, either in addition to or in subtrade
in ofstock
the property
suficient
sale. in Held,
the assignment
of the bill
that
atpdas
the dare
therein to
trade
for stock inwas
stitution
afterwards brought into the premises in addition to or in substitution

for that previously there: Laau v. Andrade, Law Rep., 5 C. P.
Div.
(*miti

l Sale of a Hora-Datls of the Rors before the Sal

became absolute.-A horse was sold by the plaintiff to the defendant,
upon condition that it should be taken away by the defendant and tried
days, and returned at the end of eight days if the
by him fordideight
not think it suitable for his purposes. The horse died on
defendant
the third day after it was placed in the defendant's stable, without rault
of either party. Held, that the plaintiff could not maintain an action
Law
v.
Aarncs,
and delivered:
Laza=v
for the price, as for goods sold
Rep. 5 C. P. Div.
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Conditional Sale-Failure to record- Validity of as against Mortgagees-Railroad-A statute of Iowa provided that a conditional sale
of chattels should not be valid as against a creditor of or purchase
from the vendee, unless recorded. Held, that an unrecorded conditional
sale of rolling stock to a railroad, was valid as against prior mortgagees
of the railroad and stock: Meyer v. Western Car Co., S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1879.
It makes no difference in such case thai the laws of the state provide
that property belonging to a railroad shall be deemed part of the road
for the purposes of a mortgage. The mortgage only reaches such
interest as belongs to the railroad company: Id.
-FbrAntecedent Debt- Question for Jury-Delivery.-B. had a contract to deliver to a railroad company five hundred cords of wood. In
preparing to meet this contract he received advances from a bank, giving his notes therefor. The bank declining to make further advances,
he offered to sell to it the wood at a fixed price, to be paid for by the
debt already incurred, and $400 additional in cash. Some of the wood
was then in the yard of the railroad, but not yet accepted by it, and
the balance was at different points in the vicinity. The railroad agreeing to accept the wood from the bank, the latter accepted B.'s offer and
paid him the $100, but took his note therefor. It was subsequently
alleged that this note was taken merely as a memorandum. By the
terms of the arrangement B. was to put all the wood in the yard of the
railroad, and he accordingly did so. A creditor having afterwards
levied on the wood as the property of B., Held, that whether there was
an actual sale to the bank was a question for the jury.
eld,further,
that if there was an actual sale, the placing of the wood in the yard of
the railroad company was a complete delivery to the bank : Wyoming
National Bank v. Dayton, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Rescission for Fraudor Action for Damages-Rule does not apply to
S'hares in a Joint Stock Company-Action by Shareholderagainst the
Company in Liguidation,for Damage caused by Fraudulent .disrepresentations of Directors inducing him to Purchase Shares-A person
purchasing a chattel or goods, concerning which the vendor makes a
fraudulent misrepresentation, may, on finding out the fraud, elect to
retain the chattel or goods, and still have his action to recover any damage he has sustained. But the same principle does not apply to shares
or stock in a joint stock company, for a person, induced by the fraud of
the agents of a joint stock company to become a partner in that company, can bring no action for damages against the company whilst he
remains in it; his only remedy is restitutio in integrum, and rescission
of the contract; and if that becomes impossible-by the winding up of
the company or by any other means-his action for damages is irrelovant, and cannot be maintained: Houldsworthv. City of lasgow Bank,
Law Rep., 5 Appeal Cases.
H. bought from the City of Glasgow Bank, a co-partnership registered under the Companies Act 1862, 40001. of its stock in February
1877. He was registered as a partner, received dividends and otherwise acted as a partner ever since. The bank went into liquidation in
October 1878, with immense liabilities, and H. was entered on the list
of contributors and paid calls. In December 1878, H. raised an action
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aganst the liquidators, -to recover damages in respect of the sum be
ad paid for the stock; the money he had already -paid in calls; and
the estimated amount of futur calls. He founded his right to relief
upon the ground of fraudulent misrepresentations made by the directors and other-bank officials to him. He admitted that after the wind
ing up had commenced it was. to% late for. him to have rescissiop of his
contract, and restitutio in integrum. Held, that even although the
fraudulent misrepresentatios might,.if the bank had l4eoq a going concern, havp eqtitied him to, rescind his contract,'respissiOn being now
impossible, as decided by Oakea v. Zurguaud, Law Rep., 2 H. L. 325,
and Tennent v: C'ty 6f Glasgow Bank, 4 App..Cas. 6i5, they afforded
noasinrle,'ai},:
ground for anId."
action..
against 'the liquidators'; therefore the actiofi
STATUTE.

Permiss've and Ob tatory. Nords-"It shall be Lawful!."-The
words in a statute "it shall be lawful" of themselves merely make that
legal and possible which there would, otherwise, be no right or authority to -do. Their natural meaning is permissive and enabling only.
But there may be circumstances which may couple the power with a
duty to exercise it. It lies upon those who call for the exercise of the
power to show that there is an obligation to exercise it. Julius v. Lord
Bisop of Oxford, Law Rep., 5 Appeal Cases.

The 3d section of the Church Discipline Act (3 & 4 Vict., e. 86),
provides that in every case of any clerk in holy orders, who may be
charged with any offence against the Laws Ecclesiastical, or concerning whom there may exist scandal or evil report as having "offended
against the said laws, it shall be lawful for the bishop of the diocese,
within which the offence is alleged or reported to have been committed,
on the application of any party complaining thereof, or, if he shall
think fit, of his own mere motion, to issue a commission under his hand
and seal" to certain persons, for the purpose of making inquiry os to
the grounds of such charge or report. - Held, that this action gave the
bishop complete discretion to issue or decline to issue such commision:
Per Lord BLACKBURN.-There is-no duty cast on the bishop by the
statute, unless perhaps a duty to hear and consider the application:
Id.
:'Enabling words are 'always compulsory, ..where they are words to
effectuate a legal right: Id.
Regina v. The T'te Commissioners, 14 Q. B. 459-474, and Ditcher
v. Denison, 4 Q. B. Div., p. 273, commented on and explained; Id.
TR.DE-MARK.
Registrationof similar Ba&e-mark.--W. & Co. proposed to register
as a trade-mark for ale a triangle with a double outline, inscribing
within the double outline the words " Beceles Brewery. Established
1830," the inner triangle having within it a conspicuous figure of a
church. B. & Co., whose trade-mark for pale ale was a plain triangle,
which in use was colored red, applied to prevent the registration of the
proposed trade-mark, as being so similar to theirs as to be calculated to
deceive. Held, by JAMEs and BRETT, L.JJ., affirming the decision
of JESSEL, M.R., dissentiente COTTON, L. J., that as W. & Co. would be
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at liberty to print their trade-mark in whatever color they pleased, and
if printed on a red ground it would be so similar to that of B. & Co.
that a purchaser might be misled, the registration ought not to be
allowed: In re Worthington & Co.'s Trade-mark, Law Rep., 14 Ohan.
Div.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Fire Tnsurance-Insurance by Vendor-Fire after Contract, but be.
fore Competion-Right to Insurance Money.-A vendor contracted
with a purchaser for the sale of a house which had been insuied by the
vendor against fire. After the date of the contract, but before the date
fixed for completion, the house was burnt, and the vendor received the
insurance money from the office. The contract contained no reference
to the insurance. Held, that the purchaser was not entitled as against
the vendor to the benefit of the insurance, either by way of abatement
of the purchase-money or reinstatement of the premises: Rayner v.
Preston, Law Rep., 14 Chan. Div.
Quacre, whether in such a case, a contract of fire insurance being
merely a contract of indemnity, the insurance company cannot compel
the vendor to refund the money they have paid, if he gets his full purchase-money from the purchaser: Id.
VEaDICT.

May be in Writing-Preparationof Alternative Forms of by the
Judge for Adoption by the Jury.-The judge read to the jury from his
written charge three forms of verdict, and afterwards wrote out the
same forms separately and passed them to the jury before they retired,
defendant's counsel expressly consenting thereto. Held, no error; nor
was such consent necessary: State v. Glass, 50 Wis
An oral statement to the jury that they should find one of said three
verdicts, and that their foreman should sign the verdict as found, held
no part of the "charge" which the statute required to be reduced to
writing: Id.
Verdicts may be received in writing in the first instance; but if that
were otherwise, a polling of the jury, and the assent of each to the verdict as read, would cure the error: Id.
Speciatinconsistent Findings.-A contract of marine insurance
upon a steam-tug provided that the insurer should not be liable for
losses arising from " incompetency of the master or insufficiency of the
crew, and want of ordinary care or skill in navigating said vessel." It
appeared that the master, while navigating Lake Michigan, the fuel
being exhausted, let go the anchor in a storm, and with his crew abandoned the tug and went ashore; and that a few hours afterwards the
cable parted and the tug was wrecked. In this action upon the policy,
the jury found specially that the master did not do "all that a skilful,
careful and prudent seaman could do to prevent the wrecking of the
boat," and that it was his duty " to remain on board of the tug, or leave
a man there to attend to the cable ;" but to the question, "Did the
master leave said boat only when, in his opinion, to stay longer would
endanger the life of himself and the crew," they also answered "Yes."
On appeal from a judgment in plaintiff's favor, held, that the findings
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are so inconsistent as to require a new trial: Lawton v. Royal Cana.
dian Ins. Co., 50 Wis.
WASTE.
Permissive-Tenantfor Life-Devise for Life of Premises suyect to
Obligation to Repair-Action for Non-repairby Remainderman in fee
against Executor of Tenant for Life-A devise of premises for life provided that the tenant for life should keep the premises in repair. The
tenant for life entered upon and enjoyed the premises during her lifetime, but left them at her death out of repair. The remainderman in
fee brought an action against the executor of the tenant for life in
respect of the non-repair of the premises within the period of limitation
prescribed by 3 & 4 Win. 4, a. 42, s. 2, which gives a right of action
against the executor of a person deceased in respect of wrongs committed by the testator to another in respect of his property. Held,
that an action of tort in respect of the permissive waste by non-repair
of the premises would have lain at common law against the tenant for
life in her lifetime, and consequently lay under the above-mentioned
statute against her executor after her death: Woodhouse v. Walker,
Law Rep., 5 Q. B. Div.
WAY. See Easement.
WLL.
ontest-Parties.-In a suit to contest the validity of a will, the
legatees and devisees are indispensable parties; and the omission to
make a legatee a party to such suit is error, for which the decree setting
aside the will will be reversed: Reformed Presbyterian Church v.
Nelson, 35 Ohio St.
WITNESS.
When Defendant in Criminal Prosecutionmakes Himself a WitnessRecalling Witness for Further Examination.-Under the statute which
provides that "in all criminal actions and proceedings, the party charged
shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness,
but his refusal or omission to testify shall create no presumption against
him" (R. S., sect. 4071), the voluntary testimony of such a party on
his preliminary examination may be put in evidence by the state, upon
his trial: State v. Glass, 50 Wis.
It is generally within the sound discretion of the court to allow a
witness, who has been discharged from the stand, to be recalled for
further cross-examination, even where other proceedings have intervened : Id.
After defendant, who had testified in his own behalf, had rested, and
after the introduction of some rebutting testimony, the court permitted
the prosecution to recall him for further cross-examination; but this
consisted merely in asking him whether he signed a letter then shown
him; and he anwered that he did not, and the contents of the letter
were not disclosed. Held, no ground for a new trial: Id.

